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Abstract 
This paper draws on a unique data set, hojok (household registers), to estimate numeracy 
levels in Korea, 1550–1630, and evidence on Japan and China from the early modern period 
until 1800. We found that a substantial share of East Asians rounded their ages to multiples of 
five. However, the extent of age-heaping was quite low by global standards, even considering 
the potential sources of upward bias inherent in the data. Therefore, the unusually high level 
of numeracy in East Asia in the early 21st century was already present in the early modern 
period. The findings imply that in the Korean case, for example, the foundations of the 
human-capital based catch-up growth were laid very early. More broadly, we argue that 
Korea, Japan, and China returned to the growth-path at different points of the 20th century, 
and this return was pre-determined by their early numeracy development. 
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This paper first employs Korean household registers (hojok) to measure numeracy levels 
during the period of 1606–1717. No prior attempt has been made to measure numeracy in 
Korea during such an early period. Next, we compare Japanese and Chinese numeracy 
figures to obtain a general view of East Asian numeracy. Baten et al. (2010) estimated that, 
despite its relatively low living standards as measured by real wages and stature, the Chinese 
level of human capital, measured by age-heaping, was relatively high by global standards in 
the 19th century. They argued that China’s high level of human capital might have facilitated 
the rapid economic catch-up once the appropriate institutions were established in the 1980s. 
Korea also achieved rapid economic catch-up slightly earlier than China, and Japan did so 
even earlier (see Amsden 1992). It seems likely that the three East Asian giants might have 
followed similar “return-to-normal”-mechanisms but at different points in time. 
A number of previous studies considered the human-capital growth mechanism but 
were unable to include data on Korea. Baten and van Zanden (2008) examined whether 
human capital — proxied by an indicator of advanced human capital, ‘book production’ — 
can account for economic growth in the 19th century. Their data set also included a number 
of European and non-European countries. Relatively reliable GDP estimates were available 
for the period 1820–1913 (Figure 1). The relationship between human capital — proxied by 
book production — in the second half of the 18th century and the growth in GDP per capita 
over the following period were quite obvious. Countries with a low level of human capital 
formation were unable to participate in the industrialization process that transformed the 
global economy, whereas countries with better starting positions managed to catch up with 
Great Britain or even overtake it. It is interesting to note that Japan invested heavily in 
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schooling as early as the 18th century, which is evident from the existence of a mass market 
for books. The high level of schooling in pre-Meiji Japan is also confirmed by other evidence 
(Hayami and Kitô 1999). Apparently, Japan’s high level of education formed the basis for the 
country’s successful modernization, whereas other Asian countries failed to industrialize in 
the 19th century. Using regression analyses, Baten and van Zanden also examined whether a 
higher rate of book production in the 18th century implied more rapid GDP growth in the 
19th century. To address this question, they controlled for the initial level of GDP per capita, 
which was available for 15 countries, and tested the book variable against this initial level 
effect (their Table 4). Book production was still positive and significant. 
It is important for our study on East Asia that China is clearly an outlier in Figure 1. 
It had already accumulated a substantial stock of human capital, but it did not manage to 
grow in the period from 1820 to 1913. However, China has grown substantially since 1980. It 
seems as if Japan was able to transform human capital into growth relatively early, whereas 
the process occurred later in China. Korea (and South Korea in particular) was situated 
between Japan and China. However, the book per capita figure is only one indicator, and to 
establish the stylized fact of high early modern human capital in East Asia, we need 
supportive evidence.  
In the following Sections, we will first review the literature on East Asian education 
and human capital before explaining the age-heaping methodology in Section 2. In Section 3, 
we will discuss the new evidence on Korea, and Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 
presents new evidence on Japan and compares it to existing studies on China and Europe. We 




II. Literature Review: Early Human Capital Formation in East Asia 
Ronald P. Dore’s (1965) landmark study offered a remarkably optimistic reassessment of 
Japanese education in the Tokugawa period (1603–1868).1 The school enrollment data for 
1868 led him to estimate a literacy rate of 43% for males and 19% for females, a remarkably 
high level by nineteenth-century standards (Hayami and Kitô 1999). Another piece of 
evidence is provided by studies assessing the existence of a dynamic book publishing 
industry and book rental market. These studies also conclude that businesses and domestic 
households were familiar with earlier forms of accounting and bookkeeping and the use of 
farm manuals (Hayami and Kitô 2004; Smith 1988). A study by Rawski (1979) extends these 
findings to the case of China, although she emphasizes that her results are based on 
fragmentary and circumstantial evidence. She observes a literacy rate of approximately 30–
45 % for males and approximately 2–10 % for females (Rawski 1979). Rawski also reports 
that educational and schooling opportunities improved during the Ming (1368–1644) and 
Qing (1644–1911) periods. Due to an increased demand for commerce, local administration 
and agricultural production, there was an educational spillover to the broader society, which 
implied that not only the elites had access to education, but also other groups of society could 
obtain basic skills (Rawski 1979; Li 2004). Rawski argues that Chinese demand for education 
and literacy should be greater than or at least similar to that of Japan in the Tokugawa period. 
She bases her argument on the fact that Chinese society, in which education was an important 
condition for upward social mobility, was relatively open compared to the more status-
                                                     
1
 The following discussion is adapted from Baten et al. (2010). 
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oriented Japanese society.  
There are further studies by Rawski (1985) and Li (2004) that also address the issue 
of a growing and prosperous publishing industry in China, with book publication ranging 
from encyclopedias or histories to romance novels or Buddhist sutras. In addition, cities and 
towns ‘‘had an abundance of posted regulations, shops signs, advertisements, and other 
material to read for profit and amusement” (Naquin and Rawski 1987, 58–59). In addition to 
other aspects, the relatively low cost of paper and woodblock printing helped to fulfill the 
demand from the large reading public, which no longer solely consisted of the literate elite 
but also included non-elites, such as merchants (Rawski 1985; Li 2001). Furthermore, Li 
(2004) accounts for the spread of arithmetic textbooks and abacuses and the spread of 
numerals for bookkeeping and accounting during the Ming and Qing periods, which provides 
direct evidence on numeracy in this period. More evidence on numeracy can be found in 
other studies on China and Korea that demonstrate the use of traditional accounting 
techniques by analyzing surviving account books (Guo 1982, 1988; Gardella 1992 for China; 
Jun and Lewis 2006 for Korea). Ronan and Needham (1978) argue that the importance of a 
lunar calendar, numerology and number-mysticism in daily life numerically influenced 
Chinese thinking (Ronan 1978). 
If we consider contemporary human capital levels, Chinese students are found to 
perform very well on international standardized tests and are consistently ranked near the top 
of all students worldwide. This fact holds even when compared to OECD countries with 
higher per capita incomes than China (Hanushek and Woessmann 2008). Juif and Baten 
(2012) found that early numeracy rates from around 1820 are highly correlated with 
contemporary cognitive skills, especially in the areas of math and science (Figure 2). 
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Moreover, Korean (“kr” in Figure 2) and Japanese (“jp”) math and science test results were 
among the highest ranked in the figure. The origin of the high numeracy levels in East Asia, 
however, has yet to be thoroughly and quantitatively studied. The impact of long-lasting 
institutions in traditional China, such as civil service examinations or government 
bureaucracy, could be of particular interest. The institutional framework and the appearance 
of an independent peasantry gave rise to the transformation of households into self-contained 
units, which were in direct contact with the market and the state. Although the main reason 
that these institutions were developed was to control and discipline the society of an agrarian 
empire, the establishment of these institutional features led to a large stock of human capital 
in early modern China and East Asia.  
 
III. Age-heaping 
The use of age-heaping measurements in the context of modern economic history has 
recently experienced spectacular growth.
2
 Age-heaping measurements have been employed 
to understand numeracy in France and the US from the 17th to the 19th centuries and in 
China from the 18th to the 20th centuries (Crayen and Baten 2010a; Baten et al. 2010). 
Beyond individual countries, scholarly interest has extended to Latin America, Europe, and 
even worldwide (A’Hearn, Baten, and Crayen 2009; Crayen and Baten 2010b; Manzel, Baten, 
and Stolz 2012).  
Measuring the ‘human capital’ production factor has never been simple, as advanced 
forms of skill are difficult to compare. Therefore, economists have resorted to the use of 
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century. Again, they found a positive correlation between age-heaping and illiteracy, 
although the relationship was somewhat weaker than for the 19th- or 20th-century data. It is 
likely that the unavoidable measurement error when using early modern data produced the 
reduced statistical significance (Baten and Szołtysek 2012).8  
The broadest geographical sample studied thus far was created by Crayen and Baten 
(2010b), who were able to include 70 countries for which both age-heaping and schooling 
data (and other explanatory variables) were available. In a series of cross-sections between 
the 1880s and 1940s, they found that primary schooling and age-heaping were closely 
correlated, with R-squared values between 0.55 and 0.76 (including other control variables, 
see below). Again, the coefficients were shown to be relatively stable over time. This large 
sample also allowed for the examination of various other potential determinants of age-
heaping. To assess whether the degree of bureaucracy, birth registration, and government 
interaction with citizens are likely to influence the knowledge of one’s exact age, independent 
of personal education, Crayen and Baten used the number of censuses performed for each 
individual country up to the period of study as an explanatory variable for their age-heaping 
measure. Except for countries with a very long history of census taking, all of the variations 
in this variable were statistically insignificant, which would suggest that an independent 
bureaucracy effect was rather weak. In other words, it is likely the case that societies with a 
high number of censuses and an early introduction of birth registers had a high degree of age 
                                                     
8
 The experience of historical demographers shows that data from premodern periods were often very rough, 
imprecise, or fragmentary. Even 18th-century statistical materials still contain a host of uncertainties and traps, 
as they were frequently collected haphazardly and analyzed without skill; as a result, they often only encompass 
a part of the phenomenon, which is incomplete (Szołtysek 2011). This refers in particular to the quality of data 
on age.  
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awareness. Those societies also introduced schooling early, and this variable clearly exhibited 
greater explanatory power than the independent bureaucracy effect. Crayen and Baten also 
tested whether the general standard of living influenced age-heaping tendencies (using height 
and GDP per capita as welfare indicators) and found a varying influence: in some decades, 
there was a statistically significant correlation, while in others, there was none.  
In conclusion, the correlation between age-heaping and other human capital indicators 
is well established, and the ‘bureaucratic’ factor does not invalidate this relationship. A 
caveat relates to other forms of heaping (apart from the heaping on multiples of five), such as 
heaping on multiples of two, which is quite widespread among children and teenagers and to 
a lesser extent among young adults in their twenties (Baten and Szołtysek 2012). This 
demonstrates that most individuals knew their ages as teenagers, but only in well-educated 
societies are they able to remember or calculate their exact age later in life. At higher ages, 
this heaping pattern was mostly negligible, but it was, interestingly, somewhat stronger 
among populations who were numerate enough not to round to multiples of five. We will 
exclude those below age 23 and above 72, as a number of possible distortions affect those 
specific age groups, leading to age reporting behavior different from that of the intermediate 
adult group. Many young males and females married in their early twenties or late teens, 
when they also had to register as voters, military conscripts, etc. On such occasions, they 
were, in some instances, subject to minimum age requirements, a condition that gave rise to 
increased age awareness. Moreover, individuals in this age group were growing physically, 
which makes it easier to determine their ages with a relatively high level of accuracy. All of 
these factors tend to deflate age-heaping levels for children and young adults, compared to 
the age reporting of the same individuals at higher ages. The aged should also be excluded 
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because the age-heaping pattern of very old individuals is subject to upward and downward 
bias for the reasons mentioned above. 
There remains some uncertainty over whether age-heaping in the sources contains 
information about the numeracy of the responding individual or about the diligence of the 
reporting personnel who wrote down the statements. The age data for the relevant age groups 
23–72 were normally derived from statements directly from the person. However, it is 
possible that a second party, especially the husband, may have made or influenced the age 
statement or even that the enumerator estimated the age without asking the individual. If the 
latter occurred, we would not be able to measure the numeracy of the person interviewed. In 
contrast, if the enumerator asked and obtained no response, a round age estimated by him 
would still measure basic numeracy correctly. A large body of literature has investigated the 
issue of people reporting on others’ age. Recently, Friesen, Prayon, and Baten (2012) 
systematically compared the evidence of a gender gap in numeracy and literacy for the early 
20th centuries, and found a strong correlation. They argued that there is no reason why the 
misreporting of literacy and age should have yielded exactly the same gap between genders. 
A more likely explanation is that the well-known correlation between numeracy and literacy 
also applies to gender differences. For our study, the question of whether the women 
themselves responded is slightly less important, as we only seek to estimate male numeracy. 
Of course, a potential bias always exists if more than one person is involved in the 
creation of a historical source. For example, if literacy is measured by analyzing the share of 
signatures in marriage contracts, there might have been priests who were more or less 
interested in obtaining real signatures, as opposed to crosses or other symbols. We find it 
reassuring that previous studies have generally found much more age-heaping (and less 
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numeracy) among the lower social strata and among the half of the sample population who 
had lower anthropometric values (Baten and Mumme 2010). Moreover, the regional 
differences in age-heaping are similar to the regional differences in illiteracy. It can be 
concluded that the method of age-heaping is a useful and innovative tool for assessing human 
capital. 
 
IV. Data on Korea 
The data for this paper were collected through a system of household registers implemented 
for the purposes of taxation and corvee labor service, called hojok (Table 1). The system 
attempted to collect data from all individuals, including slaves. The registration was supposed 
to be conducted every three years, but only fragments of hojok remain. Individual-level data 
for the county of Dansung were digitized by the Daedong Institute for Korean Studies. 
Dansung was a rural county, and literati sharing the same family names resided along with 
other ordinary people. The digitized data irregularly cover years from 1606 to 1888, but we 
decided to use only the first two years for reasons explained below.  
However, some caveats regarding the data source are in order. One issue is whether 
household heads reported ages with or without asking the other household members. The 
procedure for collecting the census information was as follows. Local officials distributed the 
form to each household. Then, the household completed the form. The local officials 
then collected the completed form. Given the absolute authority that the head of household 
commanded in Korea during this period, it is likely that the head of household generally 
completed the forms. However, we do not know whether the head of household asked for the 
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ages of other household members before they reported the number on the form. If the other 
household members were not asked in most cases, this could imply an upward bias, as the 
head of household likely had higher basic numeracy. Calculating the ABCC index for 
household heads alone, as opposed to all household members, we obtain values that were 4–5 
percentage points higher for the former (Table 2). Therefore, the estimate for the whole 
population of approximately 89–90 percent has to be considered a lower bound, whereas the 
94 percent estimate for the heads of household likely reflects an upper bound estimate. We 
considered only including the heads of household in our statistics, as those persons were most 
likely to report their own ages. However, as our main argument in the present study is that 
East Asian basic numeracy was high in the early modern period, we will include the “lower-
bound” estimate of the whole population in the following figures because it represents a 
“conservative” value that does not risk providing inappropriate support for our argument. 
This is also a promising strategy, as there are other potential sources of upward bias. For 
example, some individuals avoided being registered to avoid taxation and corvee labor 
service despite heavy punishments and monitoring systems. Some hid in the mountains, and 
others wandered around. If they were less numerate than registered individuals, numeracy 
would be over-estimated.  
Unfortunately, the Korean system of registering individuals every third year might have 
provided the possibility for government officials to countercheck age statements. Therefore, 
the best strategy is to focus exclusively on the first year following a massive Japanese 
invasion during the late 16th century, which destroyed a number of the hojok registers. 
Therefore, instead of using data from the whole period ranging from 1606 to 1888, this paper 
focuses only on 1606 for the regular Korean population. Although Korean household 
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registers were more or less continuously maintained long before 1606, the Japanese invasion 
had very adverse effects on Dansung, and many official documents, including the hojok 
registers, were destroyed (Kim 2001). Thus, it is likely that the process of household 
registration was re-started from scratch after 1606. This suggests that more realistic age-
heaping values can be obtained after the break in the registration system. In contrast to 1606, 
authorities were subsequently able to verify responses with age statements from previous 
years, which could result in an upward bias in the numeracy values for the later years. The 
Korean example of 1606 is in line with other historical evidence on realistic numeracy values 
after a “break” in age reporting for various political and economic reasons, e.g., in Japan 
(Hayami 2001).  
We also employed a second data set on monks. In 1675, King Sook Jong approved the 
registration of monks in the hojok registers. Because the reason for this decision is relevant 
for numeracy, we provide some historical background. A series of adverse events threw 17th-
century Korea into complete disarray. The negative consequences of the Japanese invasion 
still lingered, and China also invaded Korea in 1627 and 1636. Small and large rebellions 
were not uncommon across the country, and one of the largest was the rebellion led by Lee 
Kwal in 1624. To make matters worse, natural disasters, famines, and diseases abounded. All 
of these adverse events can be understood as part of the general crisis of the 17th century 
(Parker and Smith 1997). Under the circumstances, an increasing number of people were 
dead, hid in the mountains, or became vagabonds. However, the registration system failed to 
keep pace with the changes. As a result, each individual who had been properly registered 
suffered more from corvee labor service. One way to circumvent this aggravating situation 
was to register and recruit monks for the service. This idea was appealing because monks had 
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already experienced corvee labor service on a few occasions (albeit unsystematically). In 
addition, a growing number of people simply became monks to avoid permanent corvee labor 
service. Registering them would allow the government to identify, control, and exploit monks 
more systematically. Hyu Yun proposed the idea of registering monks in the hojok, and King 
Sook Jong approved of the plan on May 9, 1675.
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The registration of monks was one aspect of the overhaul of the hojok system. In 1675, 
King Sook Jong issued a law (o-ga-tong-sa-mok) according to which five (o) households (ga) 
were grouped into a higher level of an administrative unit called a tong. The law was an 
attempt to strengthen the system by correcting inaccurate entries and rebuilding hojok 
registers that were lost during the Chinese and Japanese invasions. Our data concern the year 
of 1678, which was the next registration year after 1675. Hence, they may include the first 
registration of monks in Dansung. The data set on monks is useful for our research because it 
provides numeracy values from the beginning of the registration process and is therefore 
unlikely to be biased due to authorities being able to countercheck age statements. Moreover, 
because many ordinary people became monks to avoid corvee labor service, the potential 
upward bias coming from this selective group could be further alleviated. 
As age-heaping reflects a very basic skill that is obtained during first decade of life, 
we organize all evidence by birth decades. Using the 1606 hojok, we can document the birth 
decades for the regular Korean population born from the 1550s to the 1570s, and we can 
document the same information approximately for the birth decade of the 1630s for Korean 
monks (Figure 3). The numeracy values for these observations seem to be quite constant over 
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 For the approval, see Sook Jong Year 1 May Jungmyo (9) day, Sook Jong Sillock, vol. 3; for the general 
circumstances, see discussions recorded around the Jungmyo day. 
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time and have numeracy values of approximately 80 to 90 percent, which is relatively high by 
historical standards.  
 
V. Comparison of Human Capital Development in Korea, Japan, China, and Europe 
A comparison of the results to those of similar studies conducted for Japan and China sheds 
further light on the cross-country variation in human capital development. Japanese age 
statements are reported in Table 3, which is taken from Hayami (2001). The data were 
collected in population registers in the Bungo Province in 1622. Assuming that the average 
age in Japan of those 21 and older at that time was approximately 35, the data are centered on 
those born during the 1590s. This makes the data suitable to compare Japanese human capital 
formation to the newly estimated numeracy levels for the Korean population in 1550–1570. 
The reported age statements indicate clear age-heaping on 0 (21.4%) and 5 (13.8%). In 
addition to heaping on numbers ending in 0 or 5, Table 3 also displays heaping on numbers 
ending in 8. The reason for this additional heaping is that 8 was considered to be a number 
associated with luck and fertility. In other Asian societies, the number 8 also stood for 
prosperity and good fortune (Hayami 2001). Conversely, the digit 4 was avoided because this 
number sounds similar to the Japanese words for death and suffering, and hence reported 
ages ending in 4 are relatively rare (Hayami 2001). 
A graphical comparison of human capital development in Korea, Japan, and China is 
displayed in Figure 4. Although the age reports for the Korean population and the monks 
came from different centuries, the numeracy values indicate similar human capital levels. The 
Japanese numeracy levels are approximately 10% lower than the Korean levels.  
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For China, Baten et al. (2010) used an important source: the censorial section of the 
board of punishment, where not only information on age statements can be found in 
memorial documents but also information on land prices, land rents, interest rates, and other 
personal and household data for all Chinese administrative regions. Only a small part of these 
documents, especially from the Qianlong period (1735–95), have been published (Historical 
Archive No. 1, 1981). These sources have been used in different studies, for example, by 
Allen et al. (2007) to estimate real wage developments. The ages that we used from these 
memorials are self-reported by persons in court (i.e., they were still alive at the time).  
Baten et al. (2010) analyzed whether these sources can be used in age-heaping 
studies. For example, they asked whether animal cycles for birth years in China might have 
caused age-heaping in a form other than stating ages ending in 0 or 5. To measure this impact, 
they used data on age-heaping for the most popular animal sign, the year of the dragon. They 
studied the age reporting behavior of Chinese migrants to the US, with the result that a 
preference for dragon years was visible but much less important than age-heaping on 
multiples of 5. The same result was obtained for the Chinese preference for 8 and desire to 
avoid 4. Using data from the board of punishment for the late 17th and early 18th centuries, it 
can be seen that the degree of age-heaping was relatively low.  
If we compare East Asia with trends in three European regions, we arrive at the 
conclusion that Korea, Japan and China were similar to the most advanced European regions 
in northwestern Europe (Figure 4). For Europe, the centuries between the late 15th and the 
early 19th century represent a human capital revolution. European numeracy rates grew from 
approximately 50% to approximately 95%. This is a true revolution because the nearly 50 
percentage point magnitude is comparable to the difference between the poorest and the 
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wealthiest economies of the early 20th century (Crayen and Baten 2010b: South Asia had a 
numeracy rate of 52% in the 1940s, whereas the richest countries had reached full numeracy). 
Therefore, Europe transitioned from a half numerate to a mostly numerate continent during 
this revolution. The differences between the European regions are also interesting: southern 
Europe was the best in the late Middle Ages and the early Renaissance, but the well-known 
ascendancy of northwestern Europe is also visible in the numeracy record. In the 16th and 
17th centuries, Korea and Japan had already covered half the distance of this human 
revolution, even if we take into account the potential biases mentioned above. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
This paper employs a unique data set to estimate numeracy levels in Korea in the late 16th 
and 17th century, using age-heaping as a proxy. We find that Koreans during this period 
exhibited age-heaping, but the extent of inaccurate age reporting was relatively small.  
Baten et al. (2010) argue that numeracy levels were relatively high in East Asia by world 
standards and cite the Chinese, Japanese, and Taiwanese levels. However, their reference 
period primarily spans the 19th and 20th centuries. Our findings support their generalization 
but emphasize that East Asians actually achieved high levels of numeracy quite early. In light 
of the rapid economic catch-up in East Asia, the findings also highlight the importance of 
human capital in economic growth.  
Although the primary initial reason that these human-capital-creating institutions 
were developed in East Asia was to control and discipline the subjects of an agrarian empire, 
the establishment of these institutional features created a large stock of human capital in early 
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modern China and East Asia. Due to this human capital stock and additionally required 
institutional and ideological changes, it might have been easier for China and East Asia to 
rapidly catch-up in terms of economic growth during the modern era. The timing of 
institutional establishments and changes and the timing of ideological changes may be 
reasons for the differences in economic catch-up rates in East Asia over the last century. 
Theoretical and empirical studies can be confirmed by our finding of a connection 
between early human capital and institutional development in China and East Asia (Glaeser et 
al. 2004). Furthermore, it indicates that an exclusive focus on differentials in per capita 
income would have caused a very important factor in the modern divergence and recent 





A’Hearn, Brian, Jörg Baten, and Dorothee Crayen. 2009. “Quantifying Quantitative Literacy: 
Age-heaping and the History of Human Capital.” Journal of Economic History 69 (3): 
783–808. 
Allen, R.C., Bassino, J.-P., Ma, D., Moll-Murata, C., van Zanden, J.L., 2007. “Wages, prices 
and living standards in China, Japan and Europe, global prices and 
income project.” Available from: <http://gpih.ucdavis.edu/Papers.htm>. 
Amsden, Aice H. 1992. Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Baten, Jörg, and Christina Mumme. 2010. “Globalization and Educational Inequality in 
Long-Run Development during the 17th to 20th Centuries: Latin America and other 
Developing World Regions.” Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History 
28 (2): 279-305. 
Baten, Jörg, Debin Ma, Stephen Morgan, and Qing Wang. 2010: “Evolution of Living 
Standards and Human Capital in China in the 18-20th Centuries: Evidences from Real 
Wages, Age-heaping, and Anthropometrics.” Explorations in Economic History 47(3): 
347-359. 
Baten, Jörg, Jan Luiten van Zanden. 2008. “Book Production and the Onset of Modern 
Economic Growth.” Journal of Economic Growth 13 (3): 217–235. 
Baten, Jörg, and Mikołaj Szołtysek. 2012. “The Human Capital of Central-Eastern and 
Eastern Europe in European Perspective.” MPIDR Working Paper no. 2012-002, Max 
Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Rostock, Germany. 
21 
 
Crayen, Dorothee, and Jörg Baten. 2010a. “New Evidence and New Methods to Measure 
Human Capital Inequality before and during the Industrial Revolution: France and the 
US in the Seventeenth to Nineteenth Centuries.” Economic History Review 63 (2): 452–
478. 
Crayen, Dorothee, and Jörg Baten. 2010b. “Global Trends in Numeracy 1820–1949 and Its 
Implications for Long-Term Growth.” Explorations in Economic History 47 (1): 82–99. 
Dore, R.P., 1965. Education in Tokugawa Japan. London, UK: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Duncan-Jones, Richard. 1990. Structure and Scale in the Roman Economy. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Ewbank, Douglas C. 1981. Age Misreporting and Age-Selective Underenumeration: Sources, 
Patterns, and Consequences for Demographic Analysis. New York: National Academy 
Press. 
Friesen, Julia, Valeria Prayon, and Jörg Baten. 2012. “Women count. Gender (In-)Equalities 
in the Human Capital Development in Asia, 1900-1960.” Working Papers in Economics 
and Finance no. 29, University of Tuebingen, Tuebingen, Germany. 
Gardella, Robert. 1992. “Squaring Accounts: Commercial Bookkeeping Methods and 
Capitalist Rationalism in Late Qing and Republican China.” Journal of Asian Studies 51 
(2): 317-39. 
Glaeser, Edward L., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. 2004. 
“Do Institutions Cause Growth.” Journal of Economic Growth 9 (3): 271-303.  
Guo, D., 1982. Zhongguo kuaiji shigao (a draft history of Chinese accounting) vol. 1. 
Wuhan: Chinese Finance and Economic Press. 
22 
 
Guo, D., 1988. Zhongguo kuaiji shigao (a draft history of Chinese accounting) vol. 2. 
Beijing: Chinese Finance and Economic Press. 
Hanushek, Eric, and Lugder Woessmann. 2008. “The Role of Cognitive Skill in Economic 
Development.” Journal of Economic Literature 46 (3): 607-668. 
Hayami, Akira. 2001. The Historical Demography of Pre-Modern Japan. Tokyo: University 
of Tokyo Press. 
Hayami, Akira, and Hiroshi Kitô. 2004. “Demography and Living Standards.” In The 
Economic History of Japan: 1600-1990. Volume I: Emergence of Economic Society in 
Japan 1600-1859, eds. Akira Hayami, Osamu Saitô, and Ronald P. Toby. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Juif, Dácil-Tania, and Jörg Baten. 2012. “Inequality and Human Capital Formation, 1820-
2000: Is Latin America a Special Case?” Tuebingen Economic History Working Paper. 
Jun, Seong H., and James B. Lewis. 2006. “Accounting Techniques in Korea: 18th Century 
Archival Samples from a Non-Profit Association in the Sinitic World.” Accounting 
Historians Journal 33 (1): 53–87. 
Kim, Jun-hyong. 2001. “The Historical Characteristics of Social Changes in Dansung in Late 
Chosun: Changes in Literati’s Status and Their Responses.” [original in Korean] 
Daedong Cultural Research 39: 1–31. 
Li, B., 2001. “Ming-Qing Jiangnan de chuban yinshua ye (the publishing and printing 
industry of Jiangnan during the Ming and Qing dynasties)”, Zhongguo 
jingjishi yanjiu. Research in Chinese Economic History 3, 94–107, 146. 
Li, B., 2004. “Bagu zhi wai: Ming Qing Jingnan de jiaoyu ji qi dui jingji de yingxiang 
(beyond the eight-legged essay: education and its impact on Jiangnan 
23 
 
economy in Ming and Qing)”. Qing shi yanjiu. Research in Qing History 1, 1–14. 
Manzel Kerstin, Jörg Baten, and Yvonne Stolz. 2012. “Convergence and Divergence  
of Numeracy: The Development of Age-heaping in Latin America from the Seventeenth 
to the Twentieth Century.” Economic History Review 65 (3): 932-960. 
Mokyr, Joel. 2006. Why Ireland Starved: A Quantitative and Analytical History of the Irish 
Economy, 1800–1850. New York: Routledge. 
Naquin, S., Rawski, E.S., 1987. Chinese Society in the Eighteenth Century: Yale University 
Press. 
Parker, Geoffrey, and Lesley M. Smith. eds. 1997. The General Crisis of the Seventeenth 
Century. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge. 
Rawski, E.S., 1979. Education and Popular Literacy. Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press. 
Rawski, E.S., 1985. Economy and social foundation of late imperial culture. In: Johnson, D., 
Nathan, A.J., Rawski, E.S. (Eds.), Popular Culture in Late Imperial 
China. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 3–33.Ronan, C.A., Needham, J., 1978. 
The Shorter Science and Civilisation in China: An Abridgement of Joseph Needham’s 
Original Text, vol 1. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 
Smith, T.C., 1988. Native sources of Japanese industrialization, 1750-1920. Berkeley: 
University of California Press 
Sook Jong Sillock. 1675, "The Annals of King Sook Jong," vol. 3 [original in Korean], 
available at http://sillok.history.go.kr/main/main.jsp, last accessed December 5, 2012. 
Szołtysek, M. (2011). „A sheer jungle of uncertainties and traps”: uses and misuses of 
premodern census microdata. Paper presented at the Seminar of Economic History, 
24 
 
University of Tübingen, Department of Economics (Germany), June 2011. 
25 
 
Table 1: Numbers of cases of age statements used in this study 
Country Source Reporting year Birth decades N 
Korea Hojok, Daegong, population (except 
monks)  
1606 1550s-1570s 1133 
Korea List of Monks 1678 
around the 
1630s 70 
Japan Population register, Bungo Province 1622 
around the 
1590s 551 
China Board of punishment 1735–95 1660s-1700s 163 
   1710s-1740s 383 




Table 2: ABCC value of various groups in Korea 
Subsample ABCC Index N of Obs. 
All Household Members (birth decade 1550s) 90.1 387 
All Household Members (birth decade 1560s) 89.3 445 
All Household Members (birth decade 1570s) 89.7 301 
Household heads 94.1 174 
Monks 94.6 70 
Note: Following the literature, we first calculated ABCC values by age group (23-32, 33-42, etc.) and then 
determined birth decades by selecting those in which the majority of individuals were born. We also performed 
an adjustment for the 23-32 age group, as suggested by Crayen and Baten (2010b). 
 
Table 3: Japanese population distribution by the last digit of a person's age 
Last Digit of Age Total 21 or older (Number Persons) Ratio of Population (in %) 
0 118 21.4 
1 67 12.2 
2 45 8.2 
3 61 11.1 
4 18 3.3 
5 76 13.8 
6 37 6.7 
7 20 3.6 
8 82 14.9 
9 27 4.9 
Source: Hayami, 2001, p. 25. (based on the population register, Hayami gun, Bungo Province, 1622.) 
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Figure 1: Book production per capita between 1750 and 1800 and GDP per capita growth 
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Source: Baten and van Zanden (2012) 
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